In his seminal 1988 study, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, Dimitri Gutas discusses an apparently inexplicable passage in Avicenna's autobiography. In this passage, Avicenna says that he was unable to understand Aristotle's Metaphysics, despite repeated re-readings, until he read al-FÊrÊbÒ's treatise on the aims of the Metaphysics -a treatise that strikes the modern reader as cursory and even banal.
1 Gutas suggests that the reason the treatise was so helpful to Avicenna was al-FÊrÊbÒ's claim that the Metaphysics primarily deals with being as such, rather than God and the other immaterial principles.
2 Of course the Metaphysics does discuss God, because God is the À rst principle of being. But it is not a work of theology. Why might Avicenna have found this remark to be such a revelation? Gutas' answer is that Avicenna had previously tried to understand the Metaphysics À rst and foremost as a work of theology, because of his exposure to a tradition of thought prominent in the Eastern part of the {AbbÊsid empire, a tradition that can be traced back to the 9th century thinker al-KindÒ.
* I am very grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for its support during the period in which this article was written.
1 This is to assume that the text we have, entitled FÒ l-a¯rÊÓ al-akÒm, is the one referred to by Avicenna. 2 See Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, pp. 248-9. The relevant passage in al-FÊrÊbÒ reads: « For most people prematurely imagine that the meaning and contents of this book are a discussion of the Creator, be He praised and exalted, and the intellect, the soul, and other things related to these, and [they imagine also] that the science of metaphysics and of God's unity (tawÒd ) are essentially (bi-{aynihÒ ) one and the same. Therefore we À nd that most who study it become confused and lose their way, since we À nd that most of what is actually said in [the Metaphysics] has nothing to do with this purpose [sc. discussing God, intellect, etc.]. Rather what is speciÀ cally said about this purpose is only to be found in the eleventh treatise, which is given the symbol LÊm [i.e. Lambda] ». I believe that Gutas was right to point to the signiÀ cance of a group of philosophers who are the intellectual heirs of al-KindÒ, and that he was right to contrast them to the Peripatetic movement taking place in Baghdad in the 10th century. I propose calling them collectively the "Kindian tradition". 3 The most obvious thinkers to include in this tradition are students who were taught by al-KindÒ, or students of his students. We have information about two students of al-KindÒ himself. The À rst is Amad b. al-ayyib al-SaraªsÒ (born 218-222/833-837, died 286/899), a proliÀ c author many of whose works have titles identical to works by al-KindÒ. 4 The second is AbÖ Zayd al-BalªÒ (died at an advanced age in 322/934), who is the main conduit for Kindian thought to the second generation of Kindians. 5 Unfortunately almost nothing of the philosophical works by al-SaraªsÒ or AbÖ Zayd has been preserved, but what we do know of their thought conÀ rms some degree of adherence to al-KindÒ's general philosophical approach. Another associate of al-KindÒ's was the famous astrologer AbÖ Ma{šar al-BalªÒ, whose Great Introduction to Astrology is inÁ uenced by al-KindÒ's cosmology. 6 In the second generation the most signiÀ cant À gure is AbÖ l-AEasan Muammad b. YÖsuf al-{¹mirÒ (died 381/992), a student of AbÖ Zayd and the author of numerous extant works in philosophy.
